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BRIBERY IN THE JUDICIARY: RETHINKING RECUSAL  
AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE WAKE OF 
 CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.: 
A JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE 
By Jacob Z. Weinstein
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental truth exists within the legal systems of civi-
lized societies and cultures, regardless of religious or secular affilia-
tions: all courts must be fair and unbiased.  No matter the back-
ground, rational people will agree that a fair and unbiased judiciary is 
crucial for society to function, for order to occur, and for the effec-
tiveness of the other branches of government.  The role of the judi-
ciary is central to concepts of justice and the rule of law within all so-
cieties, especially Judaism.1  The manner in which judicial elections 
take place in thirty-nine states2 violates the very tenets of fairness and 
impartiality according to Jewish law.3  The current electoral system, 
according to Jewish law, may be tantamount to bribery by judicial 
 
* Jacob Z. Weinstein received his J.D. from Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center 
in 2011.  Mr. Weinstein received his Bachelor of Talmudic Letters from Yeshivat Bais 
Yisroel in 2007.  He received Rabbinic Ordination from Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg 
of Jerusalem, Israel in 2007.  Mr. Weinstein would like to thank Professor Sam Levine for 
his indispensable insight and helpful comments from the very beginning of this endeavor. 
1 See MISHNEH TORAH, THE LAWS OF THE COURTS AND THE PENALTIES PLACED UNDER 
THEIR JURISDICTION 1:1 (explaining that the judiciary is the essential factor associated with 
justice in Jewish law); Genelle I. Belmas & Jason M. Shepard, Speaking from the Bench: 
Judicial Campaigns, Judges’ Speech, and the First Amendment, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 718 
(2010) (noting that judges have a responsibility to “protect[] the independence and impartial-
ity of the judiciary”). 
2 Belmas & Shepard, supra note 1, at 709-10 (acknowledging a 2009 American Judicature 
Society report which noted, “[T]hirty-nine states select or retain judges retain judges by elec-
tion in at least some respect”). 
3 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE KETUBOT 105a-b. 
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candidates and their contributors.4 
It has been eloquently stated that: 
Judicial elections require judges to solicit contribu-
tions from donors who will likely appear before them 
in court—a fact that may influence a judge‟s future 
decision making, and certainly, if nothing else, creates 
the appearance of judicial impropriety.  Judicial elec-
tions also invite unqualified candidates with deep 
pockets to run for judgeships,” destroy[] the traditional 
respect for the bench,” and virtually guarantee that 
judges will base their decisions partially, if not com-
pletely, upon the vicissitudes of popular politics in-
stead of the law.5 
Furthermore, Justices Kennedy and Breyer have agreed: 
When one considers that elections require candidates 
to conduct campaigns and to raise funds in a system 
designed to allow for competition among interest 
groups and political parties, the persisting question is 
whether that process is consistent with the perception 
and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence.  The rule of law, which is a foundation of 
freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary res-
pected for its independence, its professional attain-
ments, and the absolute probity of its judges.  And it 
may seem difficult to reconcile these aspirations with 
elections.6 
Clearly, the matter of judicial elections and the potential impropriety 
on the part of a newly elected judiciary dependent on political rela-
tionships is a cause for concern. 
 
4 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:1-3. 
5 Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court’s Thoughts?  The High Price of Judicial Elec-
tions, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‟Y 29, 30 (2008) (alteration in the original) (quoting Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 1, 23 (1956)) (articulating the extensive influence third-parties have over judicial 
elections). 
6 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy & Breyer, 
J.J., concurring) (upholding the New York law on First Amendment grounds, while mention-
ing the dangers of judicial elections in general). 
2
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The focus of this paper is one of comparative law and criti-
que.  It will compare the current United States law and ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”) with the Jewish laws re-
garding bribery, resulting in an analysis ultimately based upon Jewish 
law and common sense instead of a review of constitutional doctrine.  
Part I will discuss the Model Code, relevant case law and statutes, 
and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,7 a Supreme Court decision 
discussing the effect that donations to an election campaign had on 
the recusal of a duly elected judge.8  The purpose of discussing Ca-
perton is not to criticize the case itself, but rather to use it as a 
springboard to criticize the judicial electoral process and recusal sys-
tem as a whole.  Part II will introduce the reader to the Jewish laws of 
Shochad (the biblical Hebrew9 word for bribery)10 which are far more 
extensive than those existing in the United States.11  The introduction 
to Shochad will discuss the Jewish law of bribery with regard to the 
judiciary from the biblical verses, the Talmud, and its modern day 
application.  Part III will illustrate the relevance of these Jewish laws 
to the non-Jewish world by applying the Jewish legal and theological 
understanding of the Seven Commandments of Noah, specifically, 
the commandment relating to the establishment of a judicial system 
by the non-Jewish nations.12  Finally, Part IV will conclude with sug-
gestions for tempering the improper effects on the judicial system re-
sulting from judicial elections and campaigns.  Note: this article is 
based on the author‟s own translation of the original text (in Hebrew 
and Aramaic) versions of the sources cited.  The author‟s translations 
have been indicated by italicization throughout the article. 
 
 
7 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (also reported as 556 U.S. 868).  Since no page numbers are 
available for the United States Reports version of this case, the Supreme Court Reporter ver-
sion will be used for purposes of the pincites in the citations of this article. 
8 Id. at 2263-64 (holding that the Constitution required the judge to recuse himself due to 
“a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions”). 
9 All translations are the author‟s own unless indicated otherwise. 
10 See Exodus 23:8; Deuteronomy 16:19. 
11 See discussion infra Part II. 
12 MISHNEH TORAH, THE LAWS OF KINGS AND THEIR WARS 9:14 (stating that it is an affir-
mative obligation on all non-Jewish nations to establish a judicial system); see Fred Law-
rence, David Novak on Natural Law: An Appraisal, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 151, 158 (1999) (stating 
that the Seven Commandments of Noah requires the “establish[ment of] a judicial system in 
society”). 
3
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II. HOW THE CURRENT VAGUE AND FLEXIBLE VIEW OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND RECUSAL HAS ALLOWED 
“BRIBERY” TO BECOME RAMPANT IN THE JUDICIARY 
A. The Model Code and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co. 
The Model Code has only five Canons, all of which suggest 
how judges should deal with maintaining fairness in some manner.13  
Significantly, the preamble to the Model Code states: 
        Our legal system is based on the principle that an 
independent, fair and competent judiciary will interp-
ret and apply the laws that govern us.  The role of the 
judiciary is central to American concepts of justice 
and the rule of law.  Intrinsic to all sections of this 
Code are the precepts that judges, individually and 
collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office 
as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain 
confidence in our legal system.  The judge is an arbiter 
of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a 
highly visible symbol of government under the rule of 
law.14 
While the Model Code is not law, it has been adopted by a 
significant number of states and provides an insightful view of and 
important reference to the American legal definition and moral view 
of proper judicial conduct.15 
Although the Model Code appears to encourage independence 
and fairness as its goals, it provides only broad definitions with no di-
rect instruction.16  This is especially troubling when recusal issues 
 
13 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, pmbl., Canons 1-5 (1990) (discussing the role 
of judges and their commitment to maintain the confidence of the legal system). 
14 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
15 Honorable Howland W. Abramson & Gary Lee, The ABA Model Code Revisions and 
Judicial Campaign Speech: Constitutional and Practical Implications, 20 TOURO L. REV. 
729, 730-31 (2004). 
16 See generally Phyllis Williams Kotey, The Real Costs of Judicial Misconduct: Florida 
4
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come before a judge.  A judge may recuse himself on his own accord 
(or, for example, by order of the New York Court of Appeals if he 
fails to do so) when either he deems it appropriate to do so or a mo-
tion for recusal is filed.17  The judge has excessively broad discretion 
to declare that no conflicts exist that would lead to a mandatory re-
cusal, because there are simply no clear legal guidelines regarding re-
cusal for the average judge.18  Contrastingly, an attorney must be ex-
tremely vigilant about any possible conflict of interest whatsoever.19 
Recusal and allegations of bias are sensitive subjects, and the 
United States Supreme Court does not often address these delicate is-
sues.20  When the Court finally addressed the issue of recusals and al-
legations of bias, it did not apply definitive language and appeared 
unable to articulate any clear rules.21  This unfortunate hesitance to 
establish clear guidelines for recusal and bias was most evident in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.22 
Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. 
for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent 
concealment.23  The West Virginia trial court rendered judgment 
 
Taking a Step Ahead in the Regulation of Judicial Speech and Conduct to Ensure Indepen-
dence, Integrity and Impartiality, 31 NOVA L. REV. 645, 653-54 (2007) (stating that the 
Model ABA Code‟s lack of a uniform standard results in inconsistencies “in the discipline of 
judges”). 
17 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 14 (McKinney 2011) (explaining the judicial disqualification 
rules). 
18 See Jeffrey T. Fiut, Recusal and Recompense: Amending New York Recusal Law in 
Light of the Judicial Pay Raise Controversy, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2009) (noting the 
subjective recusal standard).  From the Jewish law perspective, for a judge to decide his own 
recusal motion based on nothing more than self-reflection is, in and of itself, improper.  
MISHNEH TORAH, KESEF MISHNA COMMENTARY TO LAWS OF THE COURTS AND THE PENALTIES 
PLACED UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION, 23:3 (stating that recusal in Jewish law is set forth with-
in the law itself and mandated under particular circumstances outside of the judge‟s own dis-
cretion). 
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2009) (stating the Conflict of Interest 
rules). 
20 In 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for the first time on the is-
sue of recusal involving a judicial election when it decided Caperton.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2259, 2262. 
21 Id. at 2263-64 (reasoning that there is a serious risk of bias which requires a judge to 
recuse himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in . . . the judge‟s election campaign”). 
22 Id. at 2265 (stating that Caperton is an extreme situation and “sometimes no administr-
able standard may be available to address the perceived wrong”). 
23 Id. at 2257. 
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against Massey and found it liable for fifty million dollars in damag-
es.24  The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted re-
view;25 however, prior to the hearing, Caperton made a motion for 
Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself.26 
Caperton argued that Massey‟s C.E.O. had donated three mil-
lion dollars to Justice Benjamin‟s campaign to win a seat on the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia while the appeal was pend-
ing before the court.27  Although Justice Benjamin claimed that there 
was no bias on his part, his participation in the case presented an un-
acceptable appearance of impropriety.28  In a three-to-two decision, 
with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia reversed the trial court and ordered the case 
dismissed.29  The court granted Caperton‟s motion for a rehearing on 
the issue of recusal, denied the motion for a second time in a similar 
three-to-two decision (with Justice Benjamin still in the majority), re-
versed the trial court, and ordered the case dismissed.30 
Justice Benjamin, commenting on the motion for recusal with 
a degree of amazement, focused on why he should not be recused for 
“independent expenditures” since he had nothing to do with them.31 
In his opinion on the recusal question, he posed the problem as fol-
lows: 
        The primary thrust of the Appellees‟ argument is 
 
24 Id. 
25 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 2257.  According to Jewish law, it does not appear to be particularly relevant that 
Caperton‟s case was pending appeal at the time of the election.  As seen in the examples 
cited by Maimonides, even if there was a mere possibility of the case coming before the 
court, it should have lead to Justice Benjamin‟s recusal due to what in Jewish law would 
amount to a bribe taken from the C.E.O. of Massey.  See infra notes 116-27 and accompany-
ing text. 
28 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257, 2264. 
29 Id. at 2258.  While the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the Caperton case 
was pending and that Justice Benjamin was on the majority of the decision against Caperton, 
it is not particularly relevant in Jewish law.  Id. at 2265.  The law of bribery in Jewish law 
comes into effect even if you are giving a bribe to a judge so that he may decide the case ac-
cording to the law.  SEFER HAHINNUCH: THE BOOK OF [MITZVAH] EDUCATION 324, Com-
mandment 83 (Charles Wengrov trans., Feldheim Publ‟g 3d rev. ed. 1991).  Thus, even if 
Justice Benjamin was on the side favoring Caperton, recusal must still occur. 
30 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. 
31 Id. at 2262-63. 
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not that I should be disqualified because a party or at-
torney to the instant case directly contributed to my 
campaign.  The Appellees‟ argument is that I should 
be disqualified because, without my knowledge, direc-
tion or control, an independent nonparty organization, 
[known as] ASK, received contributions from people 
or groups that included an employee of a party in this 
case [namely, the C.E.O. of Massey], and ASK inde-
pendently used its contributions to wage a campaign 
against my opponent four years ago.32 
Before entering into the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court, and based upon the accepted commonsensical statement 
that a court must be fair and unbiased, did Justice Benjamin‟s failure 
to recuse himself from participation in a case where one of the parties 
donated three million dollars to his election campaign violate re-
quired fairness or impartiality? 
Faced with these facts alone, one and all would inevitably an-
swer yes; such a donation by a party who was likely going to appear 
before the court leads one to question the fairness or impartiality of 
the presiding court.  When discussing Jewish law, the possible ques-
tioning of fairness and impartiality on the part of a judge is a reason, 
in and of itself, for recusal of that judge.33  However, the Supreme 
Court of the United States framed the issue as follows: Did Justice 
Benjamin‟s failure to recuse himself from participation in a case 
where one of the parties donated three million dollars to his election 
campaign violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?34 
The Court answered yes to this question in a five-to-four deci-
sion, holding that due process required Justice Benjamin to recuse 
himself from participation in the case.35  With Justice Kennedy writ-
ing for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, the Court explained that it did not need to find that Jus-
 
32 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 302 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, Act-
ing C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from hearing the case), overruled by 129 S. 
Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
33 Fiut, supra note 18. 
34 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256-57. 
35 Id. at 2264-65, 2267. 
7
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tice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision-making in order to 
invalidate the decision.36  Rather, it must merely be shown that “ „un-
der a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness,‟ ” Justice Benjamin‟s “interest „pose[d] such a risk of ac-
tual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the 
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.‟ ”37  The 
Court stated that such a risk of bias existed where a judge had “ „a di-
rect, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest,‟ ” as Justice Benjamin 
did.38  Although the Court reasoned that he improperly failed to re-
cuse himself, the majority declared that this application of the law 
was only for the “extreme” case.39 
Chief Justice Roberts vehemently dissented, joined by Justic-
es Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, and argued that the majority imprudent-
ly expanded the recusal standard to a mere showing of a “probability 
of bias,” raising forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the 
majority‟s vague standard.40 
Justice Scalia, who wrote a separate dissenting opinion, ar-
gued that the majority poorly performed its duties as a clarifying 
body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.41  Interes-
tingly, Scalia cited to a Mishneh in Tractate Avot to contrast with the 
Due Process Clause.42  While divine law may have all the answers, 
Scalia opined, the Due Process Clause does not “contain the answers 
to all earthly questions.”43  However, Scalia neglected to mention the 
Torah‟s opinion regarding the substantive issue raised in Caperton, 
which is in sharp contrast to the result he favored.44 
 
36 Id. at 2256, 2263-65. 
37 Id. at 2263 (emphasis added) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
38 Id. at 2259 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
39 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265. 
40 Id. at 2267, 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty 
Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts’s Concerns in Caperton and Some Tentative An-
swers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and Due Process, 39 SW. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) 
(attempting to answer the forty questions posed by the Chief Justice, while addressing the 
ridiculousness of the questions in the first place). 
41 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. at 2274-75. 
43 Id. at 2275. 
44 See Chaim Saiman, Chaim Saiman (guest post) on Caperton, PRAWFSBLAWG BLOG 
(June 8, 2009, 10:13 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/06/chaim-
saiman-guest-post-on-caperton.html (“[I]f Scalia is going to cite Talmudic law in a case con-
cerning judicial impartiality, he should at the very least inform us that the result he favors 
8
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Some have applauded this decision as a step forward regard-
ing recusal,45 including former Justice O‟Connor who stated, “Maybe 
the Supreme Court‟s decision in Caperton will stop a situation as 
egregious as Caperton from happening again.”46  However, the deci-
sion should be viewed as not going far enough.47  The majority conti-
nuously emphasized the monetary amount given to the election cam-
paign of Justice Benjamin.48  “[T]he majority‟s reliance on such an 
„extreme case‟ ” deserves critique, because more could have been 
done to further reform and strengthen the argument on the issue of 
recusal.49  As stated by one commentator: 
        The Caperton decision is really a second-best so-
lution to the problem of the influx of money designed 
to influence judges on both issues and cases.  It is an 
ex-post solution that tries to control the damage after 
the fact, rather than an ex-ante solution, which would 
try to prevent the problem from occurring in the first 
place.50 
As we will discover, this decision barely scratches the surface 
 
lies in sharp contrast to Talmudic conceptions of judicial ethics.”). 
45 The commentators and scholars on Caperton can generally be placed into two catego-
ries: (1) those that support the decision but feel that it did not go far enough; and (2) those 
who do not support the decision based on a view of judicial restraint and the notion that the 
states should regulate their own courts.  As this paper focuses on Jewish law, and the latter 
opinion is inconsistent with Jewish law, the author is of the view that the Court in Caperton 
did not go far enough.  See Adam Liptak, Justices Issue a Rule of Recusal in Cases of 
Judges’ Big Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1 (describing the case and the positions 
taken on each side, including comments and reactions to the decision as stated by law pro-
fessors and attorneys); Statement of H. Thomas Wells Jr., President, ABA, Re: Ruling of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (June 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=671 
(praising the decision as a milestone for the Court and the legal profession). 
46 Honorable Sandra Day O‟Connor, Choosing (and Recusing) Our State Court Justices 
Wisely: Keynote Remarks by Justice O’Connor, 99 GEO. L.J. 151, 153 (2010). 
47 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through 
Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249, 251 
(2010) (stating that the Court should have, and could have, gone further in establishing clear 
law and by not doing so, it caused more harm than good). 
48 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (stating that the “donations accounted for more than two-
thirds of the total funds”). 
49 See Symposium, Session 1: One Symptom of a Serious Problem: Caperton v. Massey, 
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 578 (2010) (criticizing the Caperton decision for not expound-
ing on the Due Process Clause issues surrounding the case). 
50 Id. at 584.  
9
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of what should, according to Jewish law, amount to bribery.51  Caper-
ton is not only unhelpful to the rule of law, but is also an example of 
the Supreme Court‟s hesitance to establish clear rules of recusal that 
are especially needed in the case of an elected judge.52  Ultimately, 
Justice O‟Connor opined, “No amount of election or recusal reform 
will remove the politics inherent in partisan judicial elections because 
they are specifically designed to infuse politics into the law.  Elec-
tions are intended to make our courts responsive to electoral politics, 
and that is the flaw in the concept.”53 
Caperton has at least two definitive results.  On the progres-
sive side, the ruling recognized that judicial elections are inherently 
different by nature and that, as a result, campaign contributions may 
lead to a required recusal.54  On the other hand, the Court reserved 
such a requirement only for the most “extreme” of cases.55  Caperton 
shows “how judicial campaign contributions . . . poison [the] judicial 
system.”56  It is “a textbook case of why we need to stop electing 
judges to serve on our courts.”57 
In the end, “Caperton [was] wrongly decided.”58  Justice 
Kennedy‟s assumption that the facts presented a “ „rare instance‟ ” 
was inherently flawed, as “[t]here is no indication that the [contin-
ued] trend of high-financed, highly contested judicial elections will 
abate” anytime soon.59  “Contrary to Justice Kennedy‟s attempt to 
limit Caperton’s impact and reach by the „extreme facts‟ argument, 
Caperton is likely to have far reaching and unintended conse-
quences.”60  “[O]ne leading authority on judicial ethics [has even 
 
51 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29. 
52 See Tara Smith, Reckless Caution: The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 347, 354 (2010) (stating that Caperton is an example of where judicial minimalism 
has hurt more then helped). 
53 O‟Connor, supra note 46. 
54 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262, 2264-65. 
55 Id. at 2265. 
56 O‟Connor, supra note 46, at 156. 
57 Hugh M. Caperton, Remarks, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 727, 733 (2010) (providing a personal 
reflection of the Caperton decision). 
58 Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory 
Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 376 (2009) (criticizing the Caperton de-
cision). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. (opining that the lack of a clear, strong decision will come back and haunt the Court 
in the end). 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/9
  
2012] BRIBERY IN THE JUDICIARY 529 
 
gone so far as to] characterize[] the decision as „declaring that a 
judge‟s decision not to recuse violates due process when it‟s a cold 
day in hell.‟ ”61 
 
B. Outside of Caperton, There Are Many Cases That 
Give Forth an Ambiguous View of Judicial Recusal 
Federal statutory law attempts to clearly establish the parame-
ters for judicial disqualification, stating, “Any justice, judge, or magi-
strate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”62 
It appears the focus of the law is to prevent a judge from pre-
siding over a case where a deep-seated bias and an “ „inability to 
render fair judgment‟ ” exist.63  The test set forth by the courts is 
claimed to be an objective one;64 the question to be asked, objective-
ly, is whether the (all too famous) “reasonable person” and informed 
observer would question the judge‟s impartiality.65  It is important to 
note the problem with the reasonable person standard here, as there is 
no clear definition of who the reasonable person is.66  Is it the “rea-
sonable [layman] and informed observer,” as implied in United States 
v. Microsoft Corp.?67  Or, is the reasonable person a reasonable judge 
who is an informed observer, as appears to be the opinion in Caper-
ton and other similarly reviewed cases where the standard was set 
and reviewed by the reasonable judge?  There is no simple answer to 
this threshold issue. 
Adding to the above statute and case law, the Supreme Court 
 
61 Stempel, supra note 47, at 276 (quoting Caperton Ruling May Spur States to Enhance 
Their Process for Judges’ Recusal, 25 LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 335 
(2009) (quoting University of Indiana law professor, Charles Geyh)). 
62 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
63 In re Owens Corning, 305 B.R. 175, 190-91 (D. Del. 2004) (quoting SEC v. Antar, 71 
F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1995)) (discussing the federal statute on recusal and stressing that its 
focus is on the inability of the judge to reach a fair judgment). 
64 IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (establishing 
the objective standard). 
65 See United States v. Evans, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1294 (D. Utah 2003) (applying the 
reasonable person standard to issues of judicial impartiality). 
66 Id. (stating that a reasonable person is “ „a well-informed, thoughtful and objective ob-
server‟ ” (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995))). 
67 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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has held that the Due Process Clause requires a fair and impartial tri-
al.68  Thus, the Due Process Clause would automatically apply to 
matters of fairness and impartiality.69  Yet, the Court has not directly 
applied the clause to judicial recusal matters concerning bias or an 
impartial trial.  This was explicitly apparent in the dissenting opi-
nions of Caperton, particularly Scalia‟s statement that the Due 
Process Clause did not hold all the answers to the issue presented in 
Caperton.70 
An example of the broad discretion that exists for judges to 
decide recusal is Cheney v. United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.71  In Cheney, a motion was made for Justice Scalia 
to recuse himself because of his friendship with Vice President Che-
ney, a named party in the action.72  Scalia denied the motion even 
though there was a friendship, or at the very least an appearance of a 
friendship, with Vice President Cheney.73  For example, Scalia was 
given guest seats on the Vice President‟s government airplane for 
himself and his family.74  Scalia ruled this way even though a “rea-
sonable person” and objective observer would reasonably conclude 
that such gifts were likely to affect the Justice‟s impartiality.75  Fur-
ther, newspaper editorials and the general public called for Scalia‟s 
recusal based upon the public perception of an appearance of partiali-
ty, which thereby tainted the proceedings.76  Yet, this recusal motion 
was decided and denied by the very same judge it pertained to,77 illu-
strating the need for definitive recusal guidelines and demonstrating 
that the status of the law regarding recusal and bribery needs a major 
overhaul. 
 
68 See Neb. Press Ass‟n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
69 See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); see also Weiss v. United States, 
510 U.S. 163, 177-78 (1994). 
70 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275. 
71 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
72 Id. at 917. 
73 Id. at 928-29. 
74 Id. at 914-15. 
75 Id. at 924 (“It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be „made from the pers-
pective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circums-
tances.‟ ” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000))). 
76 Cheney, 541 U.S. at 922-23. 
77 Id. at 913, 929. 
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It appears that the position of United States law is that a judge 
should not recuse himself from a proceeding when a mere casual re-
lationship exists.78  In contrast, it may appear that in Jewish law one 
can be recused for a mere casual relationship, but this is not so.79  
Contributing to a judge‟s election, thereby helping to cause the 
judge‟s success, cannot by any means be considered a mere casual re-
lationship (as the dissent in Caperton would have us believe).80  Be-
friending a judge to the extent where you give the judge‟s family 
rides on your jet cannot be considered a casual relationship either.  
No such acts should be considered casual when they have the poten-
tial to affect the decision of the court. 
Certainly, any claim involving justice and a fair trial cannot 
rely on whether or not there is a casual or more substantial relation-
ship between the party and the judge.  This is where the Jewish law 
becomes relevant because, unlike the current state of the law, Jewish 
law is more direct and clearer on the rules of recusal and bribery re-
garding a judge‟s interaction with potential litigants.81  There is no 
such thing as a casual relationship between a litigant and a judge 
when it comes to a fair trial in Jewish law. 
III. THE DEFINITIVE AND EXPLICIT RULES OF RECUSAL WITHIN 
THE JEWISH LAWS OF SHOCHAD AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. The Jewish Laws of Recusal - The Laws of 
Shochad 
The Jewish laws of bribery and recusal are rooted within two 
verses of the Bible.82  While the verses specifically speak of judicial 
bribery, the Judaic laws derived from these verses are significantly 
more expansive than the common understanding of what constitutes 
bribery.83  The verses read as follows: 
 
78 Id. at 928-29. 
79 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29. 
80 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
81 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29. 
82 See Deuteronomy 16:19; Exodus 23:8. 
83 See infra notes 92-123 and accompanying text. 
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“And do not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes 
of those who can see and corrupts righteous words.”84 
“Do not pervert justice, do not show favoritism, and 
do not take a bribe, for bribery blinds the eyes of the 
wise and perverts legitimate words.”85 
These verses constitute the eighty-third commandment to the 
Jewish people set forth in the Torah.86  The label87 of this command-
ment is simply that “a judge is not to take any bribe.”88  The com-
mandment, in its simplicity,89 constitutes the following obligations: 
“[A] judge should not take a bribe from parties of a lawsuit, even to 
render true judgment.”90  This is based on the verse in Exodus 23:8.91  
The prohibition is repeated a second time in Deuteronomy 16:19,92 
which raises the simple question of why is there the need for repeti-
tion?  The answer is that the verse in Deuteronomy refers to the rule 
that a judge cannot “take a bribe—even to declare the guiltless inno-
cent and to impose punishment on the guilty.”93  The purpose of this 
aspect of the commandment, that a judge is “forbidden . . . to take a 
bribe even to judge a case truly[,]” is rooted in the intent of expung-
ing bribery altogether.94 
The commandment goes so far as to make it a violation on 
both the individual accepting the bribe and the individual giving it.95  
 
84 See Exodus 23:8. 
85 See Deuteronomy 16:19. 
86 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29.  The Sefer haHinnuch lists all 613 negative and 
positive commandments given by God in the Torah to the Jewish People.  See id. 
87 Each of the 613 commandments in the Torah has a label.  This is because, like a book, 
each commandment encompasses many categories and numerous laws.  Again, similar to a 
book, the label and title of the book explain the subject matter of that book.  This is why a 
title or label of the commandment is needed, as it refers to the root of the commandment.  
See id. 
88 Id. 
89 The simplicity referred to here is the title and label of the commandment itself, without 
all the subcategories and caveats learned from the commandment by the Talmud and rabbin-
ical scholars.  See id. 
90 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29. 
91 Exodus 23:8. 
92 Deuteronomy 16:19. 
93 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29. 
94 See id. 
95 Id. (explaining in commentary that “both the one who gives and the one who accepts 
[the bribe] violate a negative precept” according to Commandment 83). 
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The individual giving the bribe falls under the general injunction of 
“before the blind, you shall not put a stumbling block,”96 while the 
receiver of the bribe falls under the imprecation “cursed be the one 
who takes a bribe.”97  But what constitutes a bribe in this sense?  It is 
clear and obvious that money is a bribe for a variety of reasons, even 
to enjoin the judge to rule properly.98  However, according to the 
laws of bribery, even words may constitute a prohibited bribe.99  The 
commandments regarding bribery are not limited to location (i.e., the 
land of Israel, or by time), as the violation of this commandment is a 
violation of a divine command.100  One who violates this command-
ment is not given lashes101 or the like, because they can rectify the vi-
olation by returning the bribe.102 
Some commentators opine that the source for the requirement 
that one must return the bribe is found in Samuel I 12:3.103  There it is 
related that Samuel told the people of Israel: “[F]rom whom have I 
taken money that I will turn my eyes away from him?  [Tell me] and I 
will make restitution.”104  It is interesting to note that according to 
Maimonides, one does not have to return the bribe, as a matter of law, 
 
96 See Leviticus 19:14; HERSHEY H. FRIEDMAN, PHD, PLACING A STUMBLING BLOCK 
BEFORE THE BLIND PERSON: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 1 (2002) for a broader understanding of 
this premise (noting that “the word „blind‟ is interpreted metaphorically to represent any per-
son or group that is unaware, unsuspecting, ignorant, or morally blind, and individuals are 
prohibited from taking advantage of them or tempting them to do wrong”). 
97 See Deuteronomy 27:25. 
98 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29 (noting that the underlying “purpose [is] to re-
move this evil habit from our midst, for fear that in consequence, with a bribe we will come 
to render false judgments”); see also MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 18, at 23:1. 
99 See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29; see also MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 18, at 23:1. 
100 As opposed to the violation of a rabbinic command, a violation of a divine command 
carries other worldly consequences. 
101 The violation of a Divine command often involves the punishment of lashes (being 
whipped).  Punishment of this sort in Jewish law is attached to the concept of repentance.  
Thus, if there is another manner in which the violator can repent, such as returning the bribe, 
lashes are not given.  See SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29 (noting that a judge violates 
Commandment 83 upon acceptance of a bribe and “disobey[s] a [Divine] royal command, 
[but] [h]e is not given whiplashes, however, because it is given to rectification [the bribe can 
be returned]). 
102 See id.  It is interesting to note that since bribery can come in the form of words, there 
would be no returning of such words—which would presumably lead to automatic recusal of 
the judge. 
103 See Samuel I 12:3; MA‟HARI KRAH COMMENTARY TO SAMUEL I 12:3. 
104 See Samuel I 12:3. 
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until requested to do so from the one who gave the bribe.105  Howev-
er, according to the Minchehs Chinuch, even if the giver does not 
demand restitution from the judge, the judge is obligated to return the 
bribe.106 
The most direct and clear elucidation of the Jewish obliga-
tions rooted in these verses are found in Maimonides‟s codex of Jew-
ish law, known as the Mishneh Torah,107 where Maimonides ex-
pounds the laws of Shochad and their application.  “It is clear that the 
Torah is declaring it a sin to pervert judgment by the use of a 
bribe.”108  Such a perversion of justice is forbidden by the Torah un-
der all circumstances, at all times.109  There are four incidents cited 
by Maimonides that show the effect even the simplest of acts by a po-
tential litigant have on the recusal of a judge.110  The point of these 
illustrations is to show that it is not only a bribe of money that causes 
the commandment to be violated and recusal to be necessary, but that 
anything may be considered a bribe under the appropriate circums-
tances.111 
All of these examples are originally sourced in the Talmud, 
Tractate Ketubot on page 105b.112  According to Maimonides, these 
examples are not mere illustrations but reflect the conduct mandated 
by Jewish law.113  This is in contradiction to Tosafot’s opinion in 
Tractate Sanhedrin 8a,114 where Tosafot suggests that these examples 
are merely illustrations of pious behavior that would be desirable to 
emulate but are not legally binding.115  The examples set forth in the 
Talmud and cited by Maimonides are as follows: 
 
105 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 18, at 23:1. 
106 SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29; see MINCHAS CHINUCH COMMENTARY TO 
COMMANDMENT 83; see also S‟DAY CHEMED, KUNTRIS HA‟KLALIM, MARECHES VAV § 26. 
107 This is the Code of Laws set forth by Maimonides. 
108 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:1. 
109 SEFER HAHINNUCH, supra note 29; see also S‟DAY CHEMED, KUNTRIS HA‟KLALIM, 
MARECHES VAV § 26. 
110 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
111 Id.  Note that in Laws of Borrowing 5:12, Maimonides states that words can also con-
stitute usury. 
112 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE KETUBOT 105b. 
113 See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
114 An authoritative medieval commentary on the Talmud. 
115 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3.  The Halacha appears to be in accordance 
with Maimonides. 
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1. An incident occurred concerning a judge who stood 
up in a small boat, as he was crossing a river.  A per-
son extended his hand and helped him as a he was 
standing.  At a later date, that very same person came 
before the judge with a case.  The judge stated: “I am 
unacceptable to serve as a judge for you.” 
2. An individual removed a feather from a fowl that 
was upon a judge’s scarf.  Another person covered 
some spittle that was lying before the judge and the 
judge told both of them: “I am unacceptable to serve 
as a judge for you.” 
3. There was another incident where a person brought 
one of the presents required to give to a priest116 to a 
judge who was a priest.  The judge told him: “I am 
unacceptable to serve as a judge for you.” 
4. The final incident cited took place regarding a 
sharecropper of a field belonging to a judge.  The 
sharecropper would normally bring the fruits of the 
field every Friday.  On just one occasion the share-
cropper brought forth the fruits on a Thursday.  The 
sharecropper did this because he had a case over 
which he wanted the judge to preside.  The judge told 
him: “I am unacceptable to serve as a judge for you.”  
Since he brought the fruits of the field earlier than 
normal, that small favor caused the judge to be disqu-
alified.117 
Clearly, Jewish law significantly restricts bribery in any form.  
In each of these cases, it is specifically mentioned that the judge re-
moves himself.118  There is no motion for recusal, but rather the judge 
is automatically invalid to give judgment on the case where there is 
any form of bribery, even if the form of bribery seems insignifi-
 
116 See ISSAC KLEIN, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: BOOK SEVEN THE BOOK OF 
AGRICULTURE 292 (Yale University Press 1979) (noting that a priest receives twenty-four 
different gifts obligated by the Torah for others to give him); MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF THE 
FIRST FRUITS 1:1. 
117 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
118 See id. 
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cant.119  If the judge does not properly recuse himself, his judgment is 
automatically invalid.120 
Compare this to American law, where a judge has broad dis-
cretion to recuse himself, as the guidelines are vague at best as to 
when a judge shall recuse himself.121  Jewish law, however, requires 
the recusal by the judge even under circumstances that appear incon-
sequential.122  Furthermore, Jewish law takes the next logical step 
from American jurisprudence, decreeing that such conduct is outright 
bribery and not just “bias” or “unfairness.”123 
In addition, it is obvious that in all of these examples the indi-
viduals involved are merely potential litigants.  This clearly teaches 
us that even if there is no pending case before the court, the judge 
must recuse himself in advance of any such case being brought where 
recusal is proper.  The judge must recuse himself in circumstances 
where the case is already before the court.  It may be possible to con-
clude, based on the above examples, that if the judge does not know, 
and never finds out, who it was that covered up the spittle he does not 
have to recuse himself.  It follows that anonymity may be a way 
around the disqualification of the judge in such circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is the law that a judge may not adjudicate a 
case where a friend is a party to the action.124  Maimonides and the 
Radbaz,125 another codifier, are of the opinion that this is tantamount 
to bribery and that the judgment is void.126  However, the Beit Yosef 
and the Ramah127 are of the opinion that such adjudication would still 
result in a binding judgment.128  This is despite the fact that it would 
 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 Fiut, supra note 18, at 1603 (stating that the recusal standard is subjective). 
122 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
123 See Deuteronomy 16:19. 
124 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:6. 
125 Rabbi David ben Rabbi Shlomo Ibn (Abi) Zimra, one of the greatest Rabbis of his 
time, and famed authority on Halachah. 
126 RADBAZ COMMENTARY TO MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF THE COURTS THE PENALTIES 
PLACED UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION 23:6; MAIMONIDES COMMENTARY TO MISHNEH 
SANHEDRIN 3:5. 
127 Rabbi Yosef Cairo (the Beit Yosef) was the author of the Shulchan Aruch, which is still 
an authoritative work for all Jews pertaining to their respective communities, and Rabbi 
Moses Isserles (the Ramah) is renowned for his fundamental work of additions made to the 
Shulchan Aruch.  Both the Beit Yosef and Ramah are considered primary sources for the law. 
128 SHULCHAN ARUCH, CHOSEN MISHPAT 7:7. 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/9
  
2012] BRIBERY IN THE JUDICIARY 537 
 
still be a violation of Jewish law for the judge to preside over such a 
case.129 
B. The Reasoning Behind the Jewish Law 
Now that the basics of the commandment set forth in Jewish 
law have been discussed, the focus shifts to the “why.”  There is an 
established tenet in Jewish law that a third-party to the action must 
render judgment for a person to become liable.130  The reasoning be-
hind this is that one does not have the proper state of mind to accu-
rately make himself liable in a legally binding manner.131  This con-
cept is simply that a person cannot be a judge in his own case.132 
The relevance this has regarding Shochad bribery is as fol-
lows: When the judge accepts the bribe, either in monetary form, 
verbal form, or by any other act, the judge becomes like the person 
who gave the bribe.  This means that when the judge accepts the 
bribe, the judge is considered to be part-and-parcel with the potential 
litigant.133  Because of the aforementioned reasoning, the verses state: 
“For a bribe blinds the eyes of those who can see and corrupts righ-
teous words” and “For bribery blinds the eyes of the wise and per-
verts legitimate words.”134  Even the wise are considered “blind” 
when it comes to a case regarding their own interest. 
Based on this reasoning we can ask the following question: 
What if both potential litigants gave a bribe?  Say both potential liti-
gants donated money to the judge‟s campaign, does the judge then 
have to recuse himself?  An argument can be made that the judge is 
now equally favorable to both sides and thus recusal would be point-
less.  However, the reasoning that one cannot be his own judge in a 
case would apply to the case where both parties bribed the judge as 
well.135  Jewish law views the judge as if he is actually physically 
 
129 See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:6. 
130 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SHABBOS 119a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 3, 
at 105b. 
131 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE KETUBOT, RASHI‟S COMMENTARY TO 105b (stat-
ing that one is legally incapable of having the proper mindset to judge themselves, even if 
they are only seeking to do the right thing). 
132 Id. 
133 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 3, at 105b. 
134 Exodus 23:8; Deuteronomy 16:19 
135 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 133. 
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part-and-parcel with the litigant (as if completely co-dependent—
think of Siamese twins who share vital organs and body parts).  Thus, 
it would be similar to saying that the judge should choose between 
which body parts to favor.  Since at the end of the day one of the liti-
gants will be held liable and the other will not, it would be as if the 
judge would decide which of his own body parts should win over the 
other.  Therefore, the judge would still be disqualified even if both 
litigants gave a bribe of any sort. 
C. Judicial Elections in Jewish Law 
Judicial elections of the sort that take place in thirty-nine of 
the United States are clearly an issue in Jewish law.  As previously 
discussed, the Jewish laws of bribery are not limited to the giving of 
money, but extend to all things that influence a judge in his decision-
making.136  This includes compliments, kind acts, and non-monetary 
donations or favors.137  Judicial elections, after all, require judges to 
solicit from donors who possibly may appear before them to adjudi-
cate a matter.138  As such, according to Jewish law, a judge who 
knows who has donated in any form to his campaign cannot judge 
that person or entity.139 
However, the problem is not the election itself, since the ac-
tual act of electing judges would not be a problem in Jewish law per-
se; rather, the issue is pre-election and post-election.  The taint of the 
campaign will carry over to the judge‟s term on the bench.  Accord-
ing to the Jewish law, anyone who was known by the judge to have 
been involved in these elections would not be able to come before 
that judge without the judge recusing himself.140  Therefore, it is clear 
that the election of a judiciary may take place in Jewish law, but the 
effect would likely be impracticable.  This is all true unless the elec-
tion is done in such a manner that the judge has no knowledge of the 
donations in any way whatsoever.  If this election formula was insti-
tuted, the ramifications associated with the Jewish laws of bribery 
 
136 Id. (stating that it is not just money that constitutes bribery but anything that can influ-
ence the judge); MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
137 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 133; MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
138 See Bills, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
139 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 133; MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:3. 
140 See Deuteronomy 16:19 (commanding that judges be impartial). 
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would never come into effect. 
Had Caperton been decided according to Jewish law, there is 
no doubt that Justice Benjamin would have been required to recuse 
himself.  While Justice Benjamin did not have direct control over the 
funds used to support him, the funds at the very least constituted bri-
bery by words according to Jewish law.141  It therefore follows that 
such bribery would have disqualified Justice Benjamin from presid-
ing over the case. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOAHIDE LAWS, THEIR 
UNDERSTANDING ACCORDING TO JEWISH LAW, AND WHAT 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD ACQUIRE FROM 
SHOCHAD 
According to Jewish law, the Children of Noah (all people 
that are not Jewish) have seven commandments that they must follow 
by divine precept.142  These seven laws are made up of six negative 
commandments and one positive commandment.  According to Jew-
ish law and tradition, these commandments were handed down to 
Moses on Mount Sinai by God to disseminate to all nations; just like 
the Torah, the interpretation of these commandments resides in the 
Oral Torah.143  These commandments are as follows: 
1. Not to worship idols; 
2. Not to curse God‟s Name; 
3. Not to murder; 
4. The prohibition against specific forbidden sexual relations,       
such as incest and adultery; 
5. Not to steal; 
6. Not to eat the flesh of a living animal; and 
7. The positive commandment to establish laws and courts of 
justice.144 
Non-Jews have an obligation to establish a judicial system.145  
 
141 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 131 (stating that one is legally incapable of hav-
ing the proper mindset to judge themselves, even if they are only seeking to do the right 
thing). 
142 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 12, at 9:1. 
143 Id. at 8:11. 
144 Id. at 9:14. 
145 Id. 
21
Weinstein: Bribery in the Judiciary: Rethinking Recusal and Judicial Electio
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
540 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
However, must these non-Jewish courts abide by the same laws that 
bind Jewish courts?  The issue is whether the laws of Shochad re-
garding bribery and recusal apply to non-Jewish courts as they do to 
Jewish courts, according to Jewish law.  To phrase the issue fully, is 
one allowed to bribe (according to the Jewish law definition of bri-
bery) a non-Jewish judge—or is such a person who gives a bribe vi-
olating the tenet “before the blind, you shall not put a stumbling 
block,”146 since all non-Jews are commanded to establish courts go-
verned by the laws of bribery as understood in Jewish law? 
According to some commentators, the laws regarding bribery 
do not apply to the non-Jewish courts.147  The explanation for this is 
based in the reasoning behind the laws of bribery in Jewish law itself.  
As discussed above, the reason for the prohibition of bribery is that 
the potential litigant and judge become one entity,148 thus becoming 
so intertwined that it would be as if the judge would be judging him-
self.  However, there is no concept of Krovim for non-Jews in gener-
al.149  As such, since the concept of Krovim is exclusive to Jewish 
law, the entire reasoning behind the prohibition of bribery in Jewish 
law does not apply to non-Jews.  Therefore, non-Jews should not be 
bound by the Jewish law of bribery. 
However, Nachmonides150 states in an unequivocal manner 
that non-Jewish courts are bound to the laws of bribery as interpreted 
by Jewish law.151  This means that the one giving the bribe would be 
in violation of “before the blind, you shall not put a stumbling 
block.”152  The reasoning behind Nachmonides‟ position is that the 
 
146 Leviticus 19:14. 
147 See S‟DAY CHEMED, KUNTRIS HA‟KLALIM, MARECHES VAV § 26. 
148 Referred to as Krovim, which literally means one who is truly close—such as a familial 
relationship. 
149 There is no concept of Krovim for non-Jews in Jewish law because the Jewish people 
are considered to be consistently interconnected with one another as if to make up a familial 
unit. 
150 NACHMONIDES COMMENTARY TO GENESIS 34:13. 
151 See S‟DAY CHEMED, supra note 147 (citing to the Mal’Lay Ha’Romym who takes an 
interesting approach to this argument).  The Mal’Lay Ha’Romym attempts to combine both 
opinions with jurisdictional reasoning, stating: Since Jews are not subject to the jurisdiction 
of Noahide courts, the laws of bribery would not apply to a Jew giving a non-Jewish judge a 
bribe.  Id.  However, since non-Jews are subject the jurisdiction of a Noahide court, for one 
non-Jew to give a non-Jewish judge a bribe would be prohibited under the laws of bribery.  
Id. 
152 See Leviticus 19:14. 
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commandment to establish a justice system for non-Jews applies with 
the very same reasoning as that of the Jewish courts—to have a fair 
and unbiased judiciary.  To allow the laws of bribery to be ignored 
would effectively make the commandment moot.  At the end of the 
day, the law follows the opinion of Nachmonides.153 
The effect this should have on American jurisprudence is 
simple: adoption.  Not adoption of the Jewish law itself, but rather of 
the concept.  Outside of Jewish law, there is no secular definition of 
bribery that is so broad and clearly defined.  American jurisprudence 
should catch up to this established and defined standard of bribery in 
the judiciary which has existed for thousands of years.  At the very 
least, the definition of bribery as set forth in Jewish law should be a 
guide to American jurisprudence.  Jewish law gives forth a clear and 
direct view of when recusal should take place.  The system set forth 
in Jewish law allows for true objectivity, something that is lacking in 
the United States judiciary.  This is even more so because Jewish law 
goes so far as to equate all manner of undue influence as bribery.154  
The explicit labeling of bribery shows the gravity of the offense of 
undue influence.  Such strict standards when dealing with our judicial 
system should be adopted universally.  The current United States case 
law and guidelines are simply too broad and vague to be effective in 
preserving justice and fair trial rights. 
However, to advocate that American law take the Jewish legal 
position on recusal and judicial elections would not be appropriate.  
This is because Jewish law is a distinct code of laws based on divine 
precept.155  However, American law is not so, and it should not be-
come so.  But, at the very least, Jewish law should become a guide to 
American jurisprudence in this area. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The simplest way to rectify this judicial bias and fairness 
problem would be to forbid judges from knowing the financing 
sources of their campaigns.  It would also be necessary to bar judicial 
candidates from actively soliciting money and to mandate blind cam-
 
153 ARUCH H‟SHULCHAN, LAWS OF JUDGES 9:1. 
154 See supra notes 92-123 and accompanying text. 
155 See TRACTATE AVOT 1:1; see also MISHNEH TORAH, FUNDAMENTALS OF TORAH 8:1. 
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paigning.  While this goes against the “transparency” that we hear so 
much of in the news, the interest in a fair and impartial judiciary 
should require that we discard the transparency argument.  However, 
even this solution is not palpable, because elections by their very na-
ture are politicized and it will become known to the judge the people 
who are supporting him. 
As such, the entire electoral process for judges should be 
abandoned.  It should be replaced with a two-tier system.  The first 
tier would be the appointment of judges based on merit, similar in na-
ture to those made in the federal system.156  This may limit the 
amount of bribery and unwarranted influence that can take place in 
the courts because it would dispose of campaign contributions to 
judges.  The second tier would enact universal laws in all states that 
mandate the disclosure, by a judge to an independent review board or 
judge, of any possible impartiality issues.  “Americans agree that 
reform is needed: A 2009 Justice at Stake poll showed that more than 
[eighty] percent of all voters agree that judges should not hear cases 
involving major campaign backers, and support the idea of a different 
judge deciding recusal requests.”157 
In the end, are elections an intelligent way to choose judges?  
It is a matter of fact that in many places throughout the country, such 
as New York, voters are not even acquainted in the most cursory 
manner with the judicial candidates.  Voters do not know the candi-
dates or their backgrounds, but only the judicial candidates‟ political 
party.  Many judicial candidates run unopposed, resulting in a farce 
of an election.  Judicial elections have long been a political process.  
If the courts are to be trusted, this cannot be allowed to continue. 
It is with a firm and sad belief that should the courts and the 
country continue down this path of judicial election and subjective 
recusal, the inevitable result will be an unfair and partial judiciary.  
This is something that cannot be tolerated in any part of the world, let 
alone the United States. 
I can only conclude with the words of Maimonides warning 
judges and reminding them of their duty: 
 
156 The author understands that such appointments are political in nature; however, he be-
lieves that a line in the sand must be drawn for practical reform. 
157 James J. Sample, Charles Hall, & Linda Casey, The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 
94 JUDICATURE 50, 56 (2010). 
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        A judge should always see himself as if a sword is 
drawn on his neck and that he is standing over the 
open gates of Hell.  The judge should know who he is 
judging, before Whom158 he is judging, and Who159 
will ultimately exact retribution from the him if he de-
viates from the path of truth . . . .160 
        On the outset a judge should always look upon 
the litigants as if they enter the court wicked.161  A 
judge should adjudicate only based on his perception 
of the situation, not outside influences.  Once the 
judgment is rendered the judge should view both liti-
gants as righteous, seeing them in a favorable light.162 
These are very powerful words of warning and direction by 
Maimonides.  Should our secular judiciary heed this wise advice, the 
problems that are present because of judicial elections and recusal 
may become moot.  The end result would be better for the judiciary 
and the country. 
 
 
158 Referring to God. 
159 Again, referring to God. 
160 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:8. 
161 This is to say that the judge is to take the litigant‟s word with a grain of salt. 
162 MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 1, at 23:10. 
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